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Wilson Carey McWilliamst
Violence is more than an assault on our bodies. An act is violent
because it comes unbidden, contrary to my will, inflicting on me or
threatening me with what I feel to be an injury. I can suffer violence
to the limits to which I extend myself; violence done to my wife, to
my self-respect, or to my country is violence done to me. The psycho-
logical dimension of violence is clearly revealed in references to "vi-
olent emotions" or to "violent attacks" which are purely verbal.' The
same phenomena, moreover, do not seem violent if we welcome or are
indifferent to them. A romantic might call his strongest emotions "pro-
found" rather than violent; a dullard may be unaffected by our most
acid sallies; what is rape at one time is making love at another; and
even euthanasia does not seem "violent" because it is presumed to be
in accord with the will of the patient.
Violence need not make an appearance to be real; it is most effective
when invisible. The most frequent form of violence, the threat, is only
a promise, and the promise itself may be no more than a hint or sug-
gestion, as when we "speak softly, but carry a big stick." The action
itself is not the test of violence; what matters is my evaluation of it. A
threat is not violent, for example, if I do not believe you will carry it
out; and if I think your big stick is a cane, I will take your soft words
as a sign of weakness. In fact, it is possible to inflict violence uninten-
tionally, as when I attack someone I do not know you love, or when
what seem to me harmless words or actions cause associations in your
mind which touch some deep-seated anxiety.
As the foregoing suggests, violence itself cannot be rejected as im-
moral. Violence is "immoral" only to the degree to which the will op-
posing it is good. The shortcoming of violence as a form of power is
that it is limited and is always the creature of the self it would com-
mand. Violence is "foreign" in that it speaks from outside what I per-
ceive as myself.2 Violence cannot change my values and desires; it can
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Western
Political Science Association in Honolulu, Hawaii, April 3, 1969.
t Associate Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College. B.A. 1955, M.A. 19O,
Ph.D. 1966, University of California (Berkeley).
1. Charles Silberman has pointed out that the same Hebrew word denotes both
murder and insult. C. S=RnamAN, Casis i BLAc,, AND WIrrE 53 (1964). Under an earl)
usage of the criminal law, an attack on one of our fellow citizens is an attack on all of
us because he is "ours," directly or indirectly a part of ourselves.
2. Authority, by contrast, speaks inside. Whether I accept it because I believe myself
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only use them (sometimes, admittedly, by knowing them better than I
do myself).
The threat of violence attempts to structure the alternatives open to
me in such a way as to produce the desired response. To do so, it must
convince me that the perpetrator can deprive me of something I value
more than I dislike the conduct he desires. The threat must, in other
words, prove that the desired conduct is, in a negative sense, useful to
me.3 The threat will be effective only to the extent that my response
has been predicted accurately-only, that is, to the extent that the
perpetrator has accurately assessed my values and has been able to con-
vince me that his threat is real and defines the only alternatives open
to me. And that is a very chancy business. Many men, for example,
have preferred death to dishonor, and more have sought, by responding
violently, to change the alternatives if not to turn them back on their
inflictor. Iago succeeded with Othello but failed with Emilia, which
-aside from what it may say about husbands and wives-suggests some
of the risk involved.
Yet these limitations do not prove that apparent (and especially,
physical) violence is the "weapon of the weak." The weak do not fight
back, they submit, and the violence they yield to is no less harsh be-
cause it has been effective without being translated from threat into
action. The powerless do not respond violently; the all-powerful can
achieve their results without violence ever making itself evident.
Those, of course, are abstract terms, and in human life no man is ut-
terly powerless or totally powerful in relation to another. "Strength"
and "weakness" in a relationship can only be calculated by weighing
all the possible forms of violence and striking a balance; even the weak-
est have some ability to answer violence with violence.
The weak do not respond to the strong in kind. They answer one,
more effective form of violence with another, weaker and perhaps in-
visible, but one which nonetheless aims to change the existing alterna-
to have "authorized" it or because I believe that I am "authorized" by it, I identify with
it and presume that within its sphere I am bound to accept it. Authority has, then, some
ability to change my values, and more to change my desires. Cf. Arendt, What Was
Authority?, in AUTHorrY 81 (C. Friedrich ed. 1958).
3. In the extreme case of violence, premeditated murder, the perpetrator confesses a
weakness, that there is no way he can use his victim because there is no desired response
he can achieve. Hence the 1944 conspirators feared Hitler's power and saw no way to
turn it to their own ends; they could only remove it and him altogether.
Nazi violence toward Jews was rooted in a similar fear, which despaired of using the
"power" of Jews. For this reason, at least in part, the efforts of some Jewish groups to
prove themselves useful to the conqueror backfired, though the same tactics might have
succeeded with conquerors who were more secure in their belief in their own superiority
and greater strength.
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tives. At their weakest, men turn violently on themselves, seeking to
remove the threat by identifying with him who inflicts it. Slightly
stronger are those who resort to currying favor; theirs is a petty violence
which seeks to use the self-esteem of the stronger to win more than he,
left to himself, would concede. "Either give me a tip or I will not be
smilingly deferential" is only a milder form of "your money or your
life!"4
The very strong, by contrast, are often in a position to ignore ap-
parent violence. Yet this refusal to fight back is itself a form of violence,
a contemptuous reaction which may be a brutal injury to the self-
esteem of the assailant. Every man convinced of his own rational and
persuasive powers can be maddened by the statement, "It is pointless
to argue," unless he can convince himself that it is indeed pointless
because the other is so stupid. And we have all seen adults remind
children that "we are only playing," a comment which, since the child
was being serious-else why the reprimand-amounts to "I am only
playing with you," in the adult world a clear case of contempt
Most arguments for "non-violent resistance" understand this rela-
tionship; more accurately defined, such doctrines prescribe "non-
physical violence." They presume that a demonstration of one's
willingness to endure physical injury will disturb the comfort and
moral complacency of those who have hitherto been the acquiescent
partners of the physically violent, and even, perhaps, the self-esteem of
the violent themselves. The arguments state implicitly, "In order to
continue depriving me of my rights, you will be forced to use violence;
in fact, you will be forced to kill me. There is no threat you possess
which can compel me to surrender an iota of what is mine."0
Frail men cannot be expected to make such arguments often or for
long but that only emphasizes the strength of those who do. It is no
refutation of the argument for "non-violent resistance" that the Nazis,
say, would have slain those who made it; the argument envisages that
possibility. The real limitation of "non-violence" is that it presumes
that I am in a position to compel you to use physical violence to deny
me my rights, and that to do so will injure you in some way. In the
American South, as in British India, this condition was largely fulfilled,
4. For the tactics of the weak, and the price they pay, see F. FAoN, TUE WnT rIED
OF THE EARTH (C. Farrington transl. 1965).
5. For many similar examples, see E. BERNE, GAris PEOPLE PLAY (1964).
6. Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and
exile, and scourging and in a word to give up all which. is not your own? If you
will not, you will be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a counsel.
Epicrxrus, DxscoutsEs 358 (G. Long transl. 1877).
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for the self-esteem of most Southern whites, marginal at best relative
to their Northern counterparts, depended not simply on racial su-
periority, but superiority which would be acknowledged in response to
aggressive demands for reassurance ("Boyl" "Yassuhl"). In the early
stages of the Civil Rights movement, the mere assertion of humanity,
the refusal of deference, the politics of words and marches were all so
powerful a psychological violence that they compelled a choice between
submission and a violent physical response. And some of the predicted
results, especially the activation of the complacent on the side of the
"non-violent" protester, followed.
"Non-violent resistance" was, however, only the first stage of a log-
ically escalating contest. Non-violence reflected the fact that the black
was important in the mind and world of the South. Yet even in the
South, as the rights asserted expanded, it became necessary to engage
in the invasion of various white citadels, a kind of preliminary violence
which made possible the "non-violent resistance" to subsequent efforts
to expel the protesters. In the North, the Negro has played a far smaller
role in the self-esteem of whites; racism has been more of a fact, less
of a need. Even the marginal classes, for example, were not especially
threatened by integrated buses and subways. In the South, the problem
of blacks was never that they were not noticed-quite the contrary; in
the North, it has been a vital problem. This is not to argue that life
has been more degrading for blacks in the North than for their fellows
in the South. Rather, it is to point out that, relative to the white com-
munity, and relative to the rights he has asserted, the Northern Negro
has been and remains weaker than his fellow in the South.1
It is impossible "non-violently" to resist indifference and unconcern.
Non-violent resistance even to police or vigilante brutality has little
meaning if it goes unnoticed. Northern racism is passive and not active,
and to respond passively is to reinforce and not to threaten it. The in-
ability to offer moral violence is the measure of the need for physical
violence. In a psychological sense, the Northern white possesses the
weapons of the Southern black: indifference shows contempt. And if
that were not enough, the Northern white has an advantage in the
physical tools of sanction and reward far greater than his Southern
racial brother did.
The dispute between violent and non-violent resistance results, at a
tactical level, from different judgments as to the best means of my be-
coming significant to you, which can be reduced to different judgments
7. Cf. Friedrichs, Interpretation of Black Aggression, 57 YA R v. 358 (1968).
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of how effectively I can threaten you. Non-violence presumes that I
am already significant enough that a non-violent assertion of my rights
will force you to choose between submission and violence; the argu-
ment for violence believes it necessary to add the threat of physical
violence to the always present non-violent potential, a concession to
your greater invulnerability. Both then proceed to argue that "you
have no threat which can force me to surrender what is mine," because
(1) I am psychologically freed by my sense of right and (2) I am phys-
ically free because my sense of right is stronger than my fear of injury;
it is mine to suffer rather than to yield. Insofar as either argument is
instrumental, it then asserts that you will be unwilling to pay the costs
of injuring me, though I concede that you have the ability, whether
the costs are psychological and moral, physical, or both.8
But more than a tactical argument is involved. We are not simply
concerned to determine when violence "works"; we are equally con-
cerned to judge its rightness and propriety.0 In the abstract, violence in
all its forms is a wrongdoing, a violation. In the world of events, how-
ever, it often seems necessary and the wiser course. The most difficult
task for those who would limit or eliminate violence lies in avoiding
those situations in which men believe violence to be legitimate. And
that remains the perennial challenge to political philosophy, to legis-
lators, and to the law.
Violence is the nemesis of law-makers, for violence has a law of its
own. Violence resists definition because it is protean, a thing of many
forms, which may be the one lesson taught by the continuing effort to
define aggression. Even when some definition is arrived at, violence
evades the snares of law. The subtler, psychological forms of violence
are difficult to place before the courts, requiring as they do some overt
act; violence, for us, must be at least minimally apparent. But even in
the case of apparent violence, the law's procedures are after the fact;
violence is supremely in the present and demands response without
delay. Though they may later call us to account, legislators have felt
compelled to concede that it is legitimate for us to act in "self-defense,"
and we alone can judge when, and by what means, our selves need de-
8. Eldridge Cleaver told Nat Hentoff:
But if it does come to massive repression of blacks, I don't think the majority of
whites are going to either approve of it or remain silent. ... We don't beleve that
the majority in this country would permit concentration camps and genocide.
E. CLEAVER, POST-PaSoN WrrMGs AND SPec-EIs 176 (R. Scheer ed. 1969). Many advocates
of non-violent resistance had less optimistic feelings, which partly shaped their tactics.
9. His neglect-to say the least-of this point is the major defect of H.L. Nieburg's
otherwise excellent Political Violence. H. NiE.uRc, PoLrmc.Az ViOLr.zc, (1969).
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fending. Violence is the exception which speaks to the "right" and
responsibility which is "inalienably"-and inescapably-ours; with re-
sort to violence, the pleasant fiction of a "government of laws" dis-
perses, leaving us with the judgments of men.
Legitimacy and violence are always entangled. In our usage, legit-
imacy is an intermediate moral term between what is "naturally right"
-right under the best circumstances-and what is permitted in the
situation in which we find ourselves; it is positive and not natural law.
Legitimacy delineates what can be defended. "Authoritative" argu-
ments are those we are bound to accept; "legitimate" arguments are
those we would not be wrong to make. The appeal to what is "legit-
imate" is self-defense against moral criticism, and "it is legitimate"
might easily be translated into "it is only human."
It was with this in mind that Rousseau asserted that the enchainment
of free-born man could be "made legitimate"-that it could be de-
fended in terms of man's condition.0 Legitimacy is casuistry, and de-
fines the limitations of our obligations partly in terms of our power,
which is the reason that appeals to legitimacy in political rhetoric so
often sound like rationalization-and so often are. ("It is legitimate to
cooperate with Franco because ....")
Even if we do not agree, we are familiar with statements like "it is
legitimate for me to cheat on my income tax because otherwise I would
suffer relative to those who do." It would be absurd, by contrast, to
argue that "I have the authority to," for authority is right in a purer
sense. The argument proceeds from authority, the implicit rule for the
ideal case, and declares that because the rule cannot protect me in the
present case, a violation is "legitimate." In other words, "I am acting
in self-defense, answering a violence with a violence." A more moralis-
tic justification would come to the same result. The potential cheater
might argue that "the letter killeth and the spirit giveth life"; the law,
he would claim, did not intend that I should suffer relative to others,
and hence paying my taxes honestly would violate the spirit of the law.
By violating the letter of the law, I am defending that spirit against
those who attack it.
Rhetorically, the first argument is "liberal" ("it is my right to defend
myself"), the second conservative or radical ("it is my duty to defend
the right"). Both, however, depend-like the apprehension of violence
-on a definition of myself, of that which is properly mine and hence
legitimate for me to defend. Against the individualist, for example, we
10. JJ. RoussF~u, Tnn SocuL CoRraarc 4 (G. Cole transl. 1950).
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might argue that unless he identifies his pecuniary resources with him-
self, he will not suffer, and that he ought not to make such a iden-
tification. Or we might argue that he will only injure "his" government,
presuming that he identifies with the state. To the moralist, we would
probably answer, "two wrongs do not make a right," which translates
as "your role has been laid down by the letter; it is not yours to judge.
Leave that to the law enforcement agencies (or God, or History)." And
to make the moral claim that "it is legitimate to ask a man to die for
his country," we must presume not only that the country is "his," but
that his life-at least under present circumstances-is his country's and
not his own.
If no other factor is considered, the more a man feels is rightfully
his, the more likely he is to feel under attack, and consequently, the
more likely he will believe that a violent response is legitimate. If I
create an expectation of some good result, I have allowed another to
take rightful possession before the event, and if he does not receive the
benefit, I must expect that he will feel robbed."1 It is the expectation,
not the promise, that is critical; if I am a well-known liar, the promise
will have little effect. Much of the violence in our society is attribut-
able to this growing sense of right; some of it would have been avoided
if the well-advertised "credibility gap" had extended to the promise of
the war on poverty, or if the pledge of racial equality had come from
Senator Thurmond. Great problems, as more than one parent has dis-
covered, arise when one makes off-handedly a promise that another
takes seriously.
At least one other factor, however, must be considered. Legitimacy
involves, in addition to what is properly mine, the circumstances in
which I find myself and my power to affect them. If I can compel
Americans to pay their taxes honestly I can no longer claim that it is
legitimate for me to cheat on my return without denying the legitimacy
of the tax itself. In fact, I cannot legitimately avoid any injury if my
suffering is the best means to a greater good-as in the unlikely event
that my suffering would shock Americans into a new state of fiscal
rectitude.
Conversely, suffering which is "meaningless"-which cannot reason-
ably be expected to change conditions for the better-is more than can
legitimately be expected. We did not hail into the war-crimes docket
every private who, under threat of execution, violated a rule of war
11. Here, as elsewhere in this paper, see Davies, Toward a Theory of Retolution, 27
Am. Soc. R, . 5 (1962).
629
The Yale Law Journal
(though one who refused to do 8o would deserve our praise); we re-
served that judgment for those we believed to have had some hand in
shaping events and whose resistance might reasonably have been ex-
pected to have some effect12
Legitimacy depends, then, on a judgment of the significance of our
conduct, a moral chi-square test applied to the unit being judged.
Morally, however, that test is difficult. Most of us would reject the legit-
imacy of any suggestion that we cast our vote randomly, though in most
elections a single vote is neither absolutely nor even statistically sig-
nificant; in other cases, including, oddly, the publishing of possibly
dangerous research by scientists 3 as well as decisions to buy or not to
buy South African lobster, we accept our "unimportance" in the ag-
gregate of individual decisions with little hesitation. The statement,
"America cannot legitimately tolerate ... ," the assertion of a special
significance and responsibility, is likely when used in international
affairs to be classified as "arrogant" by those who themselves use it,
rightly, in relation to domestic poverty, and vice versa. And one who,
like Henry Adams's medieval men, saw his daily life as a role in a
cosmic drama, might disobey Nazi orders even when threatened with
what, by the standards of this world, would seem an unnoticed death.
(Our evidence seems to indicate that most who did disobey had some
such vision, for which humanity, in the tattered rags of its honor, may
be thankful.)
The test is difficult because my "significance," my power to affect
others, necessarily involves an assessment of them and of their power to
affect me. My judgrmeit of my significance, in other words, is "other-
directed" in ways which my definition of my rights need not be. That
fact meang that my judgment of my significance is peculiarly open to
my desire to excuse and rationalize bad conduct. In defining our rights,
we may be prone to delusions of grandeur; In defining our significance,
we are at least as prone to delusions of impotence. Impotence may ex-
cuse surrender, but it can equally excuse violence ("we have no choice
but to fight").
As a general rule, the likelihood of apparent violence increases with
our definition of our rights, but has some tendency to fall as our feel-
ings of Significance rise. The more we can affect the environment, the
12. Blackstone wrote that the law "does by no means command any opposition to a
king de jure, but excuses the obedience paid to a king de facto .... [T]he law compels
no man to yield obedience to that prince whose right, by want of possession, Is rendered
uncertain and disputable." 4 BLACE SONE, COMMENTARIES *78.
13. social scentists, because they haVe reason td kho¢w better, tire the ivbrit offenders,
but fortunately they are partly excused by their ineffectiveness.
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more we can obtain or protect what is rightly ours. As such feelings
increase, we will feel less threatened and, once we have obtained otr
rightful due, we will be less likely to use violence. It is this heavily
qualified fact that has led Hannah Arendt to distinguish so sharply
between power and violence-in fact, to dichotomize them-a useful
but misleading analysis, 14 Power is the capacity to affect reality, and
violence can at least do that. A declining likelihood that we will
employ overt violence-that is, that violence will become apparent-
may but need not be the result of our possession of more reliable, less
limited powers (like authority). It may also reflect our confidence that
we could employ violence successfully if the need arose. And in any
case, violence remains present in the continuum of power, a possible
means to the realization of what is mine by right.
These arguments can be reduced to a simple ratio. The structure of
human confrontation is i2 : -, where i = the ability to injure and r -
r1  r2
the sense of right of each individual or group. Thus, the basic situation
in which violence will appear is, in terms of the ratio, one in which one
1 l+x
party believes that its terms are T 1 , or, "I can hurt you more
than you can hurt me." In this, the violent situation per se, there is
not simply a conflict of rights and strengths but an imbalance or dis-
equilibrium of legitimacies.
1 2
It is also instructive that in the situation where 1 : T' or where I
can deprive you of what is yours twice over, but you can only deprive
me of half of what is mine, the likelihood of my offering violence is
great, but so is the likelihood that you will submit. The appearance of
violence, which depends on your acceptance of my "offer," is more
likely as the relationship approaches 1:I, and hence the conclusion
that overt violence is the weapon of the moderately strong.
However, as the likelihood of your accepting my challenge increases,
I am likely to be more hesitant in making it. In a perfectly calculable
universe, violence would never become apparent and the world of hu-
man affairs would consist of stand-offs and nominally peaceful cases of
submission. But a confrontation is a relationship of legitimacies, not
simply of power, and it is that fact which has upset the mechanistic
schemes of those who dreamed of such an apparently peaceful world.
The relationship can be changed to my advantage if I can increase my
14. Arendt, Reftectigns on Violenoq, 23 J. INT. OArAms 1, 21 (1909).
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ability to injure you, or if I can decrease your ability to injure what is
"rightfully mine."'5,
The problem is that a disparity of moral intensity is inherently in-
credible until it is tested. Initially, my only means of judging your
willingness to suffer is introspection, and my ego is unlikely to tell me
that you are more willing to suffer, are "morally stronger," than I am
without some more emphatic indication than your bare assertion of the
fact. From this problem has come more than one unexpected conflict
and more than one sad resort to "calculated" threats of violence. (By
contrast, the major protagonists of non-violent resistance knew that
their assertion of greater moral strength would be "tested," and they
calculated on that basis.)
Up to this point, power and right have been treated analytically as
separable phenomena, establishing the general tendency for the pro-
pensity to overt violence to rise with increasing feelings of right and to
fall with increasing feelings of power. In human affairs, however,
feelings of right and feelings of power are closely related, rising and
falling together, and the problem is correspondingly more complex. As





0 x y z h o x y z n
FIGU. I
power when my sense of right (r) is greater than my power (p) to realize
it, and falls with an increasing sense of right so long as my power to
realize that right is, in my eyes, more than adequate-in a simple sense,
because it gives me confidence and safety, in a slightly more complex
one, because it creates and reinforces a feeling that violence is un-
necessary.
15. Two kinds of defenses against your ability to injure me are possible: (1) physical,
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The likelihood of violence is greatest in a situation of moderate
strength in which I believe myself to have enough, but only enough,
power to defend my right (point x to point z in Figure 1), or at least,
where I believe this to be the case. It also makes evident that in any
relationship or society where what is "mine" conflicts with what is
"yours" (and where, consequently, my power to realize it necessarily
conflicts with yours), violence is unlikely to appear so long as the units
stand in a relationship of radical inequality (some below x, others
above z). But such a society is not "non-violent": rather, it is based on
an extremely successful use of threat, of psychological violence. Nor is
such a relationship stable, though it may be calm for long periods. Any
increase in the right and power of the disadvantaged is automatically
a relative decrease in the power of the advantaged.
Even where there is no necessary conflict between, or even where
there is agreement on, rights and powers; even where there is thorough-
going equality, and men and groups rise and fall together; even in such
cases, there is a potential for conflict wherever the units in question
perceive themselves as having less than enough or only enough power
to realize what is theirs (that is, all are below z). And men being men-
that is, creatures whose condition is never one of perfect safety-they
will demand a "safety factor," a margin which prolongs the condition
of having barely enough power (from y to z) until that margin of
confidence becomes an expectation of security.'
All human relationships will thus tend toward violence until all the
units of such relationships are confident of their ability to realize and
protect what is theirs. Violence will, of course, always be possible, but
the probability will fall to the extent that such confidence exists.
Even under such ideal circumstances, however, we shall not be "safe";
and our insecurity will always be more than the minimal doubt that
must always be present in human affairs. To the extent that we are
forced to "retrogress" (move toward 0 on the horizontal axis in Figure
1), we will move toward a condition in which violence will appear, and
since the expectation of security will-like all expectations-have be-
come a right, we will feel robbed. The marginal effect of a backward
as in fortresses or ABM's, and (2) psychological, by, increasing my "firimns in the right,"
the price I am willing to pay, which amounts to an increase in m), nfl! of "right." ('1
have a right to equality, provided..." asserts a "smaller" right than tie unqualified state-
ment would-)
16. This analysis has ominous implications for the political future of underdeveloped
countries in the short term. See GAmusoxs AND Govmr.t~r.r 03-327 (W. McWilliams ed.
1967).
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step toward violence is, for that reason, greater than the marginal effect
of steps away from it, Although a society may repress violence, such a
course has a long-term potential of instability. The safe course when
violence has appeared is to increase the sense of right and power of
those who have become visibly violent, and to continue to do so for
all members of the society (or at least, to stabilize their position) after
the likelihood of violence has passed.
This analysis confirms one of the few propositions on which the
religious and the liberal-contractarian elements of our political tradi.
tion agree: that whether society is conceived as covenant or contract,
violence precedes either. God tested Noah's firmness in the faith against
the violence of being thought a fool, and gave him the "rainbow sign"
only after flooding the world and warning him of the "fire next time."
He tested Abraham repeatedly and severely, and since He "renewed"
His covenant for the last time only after Abraham proved willing to
sacrifice Isaac-after a violent demand for violence-it must have been
one of the original conditions. Even the unequal relations of man and
God, however, are not a one-way street; God argued with Abraham,
getting rather the worst of it, and bargained and later wrestled with
Jacob. And that record of violence only reflects an even more ancient
condition.
Men meet the world as a strange place and encounter one another as
strangers, meeting fearfully but, in the beginning at least, without
proof that the other is superior in that combination of physical strength
and will which constitutes power. Chesterton reminded us of the ancient
euphemism in which a "meeting" was a duel. 7 And so it is, as anyone
can verify who has watched children deal with objects or with one
another; who has seen adolescents meet the opposite sex in that curious
ritual in which the female, assumed by both to be of inferior physical
strength, must prove her "right" to be considered a person by enduring
the hazing of hair-pulling and miscellaneous swatting; who has been
part of the intricate feint and retreat that is the conversation of adult
strangers.
The principle with which the child confronts the world, and with
which we, perennial children in part, confront the strange, is that which
Locke laid down as the right of nature: that whatever I can make or
shape is mine, legitimately a part of me, my "property," and hence
something I claim by right and not by violence. It is an attitude sanc-
tioned by usage: "making" a woman (curious egotism of the male) is not
17. G.K. CHMSTERTON, What is America?, in WHAT I SAW IN AmERICA 1, 2 (1922).
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using "violence" toward her because I am shaping her will to conform
to mine, "making" her what I desire.
The discovery of other wills is painful, threatening in itself and
something we would not acknowledge unless forced to do so. That
which resists without violence-I think of a stone, for example-is a
mystery, a power to be sure, but one which may yet be found out and
made mine by being shaped. It is only those things which respond
violently to my effort to shape them-which answer violence with
violence-which suggest an active will separate from, because opposed
to, my own.
Not for nothing have men seen anthropomorphic beings in the beasts,
in lightning and the sea, and in death. The first cunning of mankind
consists, in fact, in the effort to make allies of those forces which resist
non-violently, which at least have not demonstrated hostility. Later, he
seeks mastery of the violent forces which are predictable and less
threatening when compared to the mad unpredictability of others-
especially of men-and the maddeningly unpredictable certainty of
death.
It is in man's violent response that we learn to see him as a will, one
which, by physical resemblance, I classify with myself as "another
man." Those mystics, like Emerson, who are unwilling to recognize
violence ("if the red slayer thinks he slays . . .") reflect an ego which
has never surrendered the dream of eliminating the other as a separate
will, of shaping and becoming "one" with it."' Not much better is the
liberal's effort to "understand" violence, and no better at all the urge to
"master nature"-which includes, necessarily, the desire to master men,
shaping them into something incapable of violence, and hence a peace-
ful part of what is "rightfully mine."
Surely the most agonizing element in the conflict between parent
and child, necessary as well as primordial, is that the child, which has
been shaped in critical ways, must act violently to reveal itself per-
sonally. In the early years, the parents are too strong for the conflict to
be serious (save to the child); in the middle years, the child who has
been "mine" asserts a right to become his own, a rebellion which is
theft to the old owner, whatever it is to the new.
It is only after violence that men recognize one another, and only
after it that they recognize obligations to one another (obligations which
tend to follow the degree of violence which has preceded them). One
18, "The universei" D, H. Lawrence wrote of Whitman, "adds up to ONE./One./I.1
Vhich is Walt." D. H. LAwRENE, STuDIES IN CLAssIc Ammucm LnEPTure 178 (1923).
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who does not know that he most fears those he loves has not known
much in the way of love. There are few other inferences to be drawn
from the fact that when men become brothers they enact a symbolic
death and rebirth, and even the smile-on our face or the tiger's--is a
sign of well-being and a reminder of a capacity to fight with tooth and
claw.
"Be at least mine enemy!"-thus saith true reverence that dares
not ask for friendship. If one seek to have a friend one must also be
ready to wage war for him: and in order to wage war, one must be
able to be an enemy.19
What applies to personal confrontation applies in part to confronta-
tion with the political community-if for no other reason than because
so many of our ideas of the state presume that it arose out of a need to
escape a condition in which violence and the threat of violence were
constant, the "state of war."
Hobbes was not the first to realize that if men feel confident of de-
feating another, they doubtless will try to do so, nor the last to try to
taunt them into peace by raising an uncertainty as to the result.20 It
was wisdom, however, that led him to regard the drawn battle, the
perception of a 1:1 ratio of legitimacies, as an opportunity for rcdefin-
ing right. When men discover that they cannot control or eliminate
the other without suffering equally, they may conclude that this threat
is also a possible benefit. If so, they may agree to define as illegitimate
-as not part of "right"-those parts of asserted right which are neces-
sarily in conflict, accepting as clearly legitimate only so much as is
common, leaving a fairly narrow middle ground to be defined by cir-
cumstance.
It is critical to Hobbes's view that the non-appearance of violence is
not equivalent to its non-existence. Only the creation of a right which
excludes conflict, natural law in place of natural right, brings peace.
Having, to this extent, a common view of what is "rightfully mine,"
men become parts of the same person, in effect one person, though
Hobbes-anticipating the resistance of the Old Adam-was careful to
call this person "artificial." In one of his most difficult passages, after
proclaiming the right of sovereigns "by institution" (the qualification
is critical) to judge what doctrines comport with peace and may be
taught, Hobbes announces that, except by the "negligence or unskill-
fulness" of rulers, this cannot be contrary to truth:
19. F. NmZSCHE, THus SPA E ZATHUSTRA 73 (A. Tille transl. 1906).
20. "[Ihe weakest hath the strength to kill the strongest, either by secret machination
or by confederacy .... " T. HOBBES, Lxm'xAN 105 (H. Schneider ed. 1958).
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Yet the most sudden and rough bustling in of a new truth that
can be does never break the peace but only sometimes awake the
war. For those men that are so remissly governed that they dare to
take up arms to defend or to introduce an opinion are still in war,
and their condition not peace but only a cessation of arms for fear
of one another, and they live as it were in the precincts of battle
continually.21.
If, in other words, the truth results in war it is not because it affects
men's ability to injure-which remains constant-but because it affects
their sense of right. It is a proof of remiss government that it has al-
lowed the previous, common right to disintegrate. (If it never existed,
government is worse than remiss.) Peace and truth are never contraries,
Hobbes argued, but truth is the enemy of violence, even violence long
hidden under a seeming calm.
Hobbes was hardly sanguine; he was not predicting that battle, even
drawn battle, would result in a redefinition of right, only that it might
do so. Men could change their ability to injure one another into an
ability to make claims. Men could not eliminate their frailties and
follies, something only God could do; but they could create a new
legitimacy, a new right and a new power, the "Mortal God" of civil
society to help fill the gap.
Yet there is a hiatus in Hobbes's theory. His radically private view of
man, of man whose sense of "right" is in no sense dependent on his
power, meant that his citizen was one who expected, chiefly, the benefit
of being let alone by others and by the law. That such men would feel
an obligation to the state was hardly to be expected except in very
minimal ways; by lowering the "power" of individual men by introduc-
ing the state as a power to "awe" them, a new relationship, Hobbes
lowered what men would feel could "legitimately" be asked of them.
Obligation would depend on the power of abstract reason in the minds
of men, and given Hobbes's man, this could never be very high. In
part, this is due to the ambiguity of Hobbes's theory of human nature.
In one sense, he presumes a "new man" in civil society, able to obey the
natural law which reflects the needs of his true nature. In other words,
there is a teleological element in the theory despite its ontological
form. 
22
Locke attacked Hobbes at precisely this point of weakness. First, he
argued, Hobbes's state is too strong in relation to individual men if it
really is strong, and the fearful men of Hobbes's theory could never
21. Id.
22. See generally L. ST-AUss, THE PoLrnc.%L Pnxasomy OF olonnrs (F Sinclair transl.
1936).
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have created this new threat, separate from themselves. Men are not
such fools, Locke contended, as to "avoid what mischiefs may be done
them by polecats and foxes, but to think it safety to be devoured by
lions."23 Second, however, Hobbes's government is in fact too weak to
control men. Since men could not really "give up" their rights, and
would not even promise to give up many, they could only be wooed
into docility by advantage or threatened into it by power. Hobbes had
not provided the power, apart from the force of the governors them-
selves, because he had not rooted the state in men's sense of their own
advantage beyond the rational obligation to support a "common good,"
which would "make the mightly Leviathan of a shorter duration than
the feeblest creatures .... ,,24
These defects, Locke argued, could be remedied by entrusting gov-
ernment to the majority, a violence potential greater than the rest of
the society combined,25 and by relying on the inherent divisions within
the majority and on its desire to avoid driving the minority to desperate
measures to obviate the danger of tyranny.
Agreeing with Locke that right was a constant (and not, as Hobbes
had seen it, partly variable), the authors of The Federalist and others
in the Lockean tradition also agreed that the only solution was to make
the individual weak and the state strong. But they feared that Locke
had failed to make sufficient provision against the possible unity-and
hence tyranny-of the numerical majority. In The Federalist, the
danger, since man's feelings of right were constant, was simply his
power, and no man or group of men could be allowed to feel confident
in it. Madison wrote that man himself, like his reason, was timid and
cautious when left alone, and the Framers set out to make him so. The
principle in government-"checks and balances"-and outside it, where
the Framers relied on the greater number of groups in a large state to
lessen the influence of any one of them, was divide et impero, the weak-
ness of the parts guaranteeing the good of the whole. When Tocqueville
spoke of the "tyranny of the majority" he was, as he knew, both praising
the Framers's success and criticizing their intent. They had succeeded
in avoiding most of the danger of a tyranny of a numerical majority by
making all men equal because all equally weak, and in so doing, had
created a worse form of majority tyranny than that which they had set
out to avoid.
23. J. Loci, Two TEATisEs OF GovRNmErN 372 (P. Laslett cd. 1960) (Second Treatise).
24. Id. 377.
25. "[Ilt is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries
it .... " Id. 375.
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They had, in fact, done more systematically what Locke had set out
to do. That is, they had set the individual at the low end of the horizon-
tal axis in Figure 1,20 the "whole" at the upper. And having guaranteed,
to their satisfaction, both a non-tyrannical regime and the existence of
"peace," they hoped that the enfeebled individual would identify with
the whole which guaranteed his private safety and prosperity.
The means they selected, however, worked against that last hope.
The large state made it far more difficult to identify with the com-
munity, at least in the sense that it made the significance of the in-
dividual so small as to lessen sharply his feelings of what could legit-
imately be asked of him beyond the enjoyment of his private "right."
(Hawthorne wrote, in terms which are much truer today, that "one
twenty-millionth of a sovereign" does not delight in being within the
"delegated authority of his agents.") Feelings of ability to affect the
whole, the sense of significance that strengthens the sense of legitimacy,
have always depended-as Tocqueville recognized-on local govern-
ment and organization to develop a sense of obligation by giving the
individual a sense of control over what was near and, by gradations, of
what was far. But that weaning of the individual away from his status
as a fearful, isolated and private being, too weak to resist the whole but
unwilling to act unless forced, has always been imperfect. And in our
times, as technology and modem organization shatter the old localities,
it has all but disappeared.
It is for that reason that we have always been, in part, a violent so-
ciety. When any group (or individual) has felt itself in a position of
rising strength or right-of rising legitimacy-in relation to the whole,
its tendencies toward violence have increased accordingly. Similarly,
those who have-by being in the elite of participants or by identifica-
tion vicariously achieved-felt themselves to be "one" with the society
have resisted such claims violently, feeling themselves dragged back
from a safe ability to realize and protect "their own." Yankee resisted
Irishman, after all, with a bitter savagery; draft resistance today-not
to mention desertion-is little more than a shadow of what it was in
1863. The catalogue is too extensive to complete, but must include, at
least, the A.P.A., the Klan, and Anglo-Californian violence toward
"Okies" and Orientals-to say nothing of contemporary examples, A.
Mitchell Palmer and the bloody record that is the history of labor.
It is for this reason, too, that Americans have always secretly admired
26. See p. 632 supra.
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the man of violence.27 All nations have this problem to some degree,
such being man, but rarely so explicitly, and even where Americans
watch with horrified eyes, or, at least, words, the fascination betrays.
The identification between me and the great state is either fairly feeble
or largely spurious and something in my mind will tell me so, even if I
shut it off from consciousness as too threatening to bear. The only
variation is the different men of violence with whom different selves
find identification easy, such as private detectives, tough cops or soldiers
for the conventional, "Che," Mao and the like for others.
In this, as in many things, Rousseau was a lonely voice and one
which spoke only too little to Americans. Rousseau diverged from the
presumption that the chief aim of government is to avoid overt violence,
pointing out that the very existence of government is a violence to
man as he originally is, that laws and institutions inevitably shape him,
that he has no innate and invariable sense of "right." When Rousseau
remarked that man "must" give up all his powers to the state and the
community, he meant just that: that he must. Being born with a sell
and a sense of right that is at best inchoate, man receives back from
the community the "self" that will be his. Government is justified
when it improves on the original condition of man, when it drives
private, fearful children into a broader, stronger, more confident and
wiser version of self. Government, for Rousseau, was the result of a
violent confrontation between the "general" and the "particular" will,
and good government was the ally of the former in its effort to "force"
the individual to be "free."
Rousseau was a developmental psychologist, and his argument pre-
sumes that the good society frees the individual of his particularity-
and the anxiety that goes with it-precisely by encouraging and com-
pelling identification, by making claims on the individual and allowing
him to make them in turn-that is, by emphasizing his significance in
relation to others. That strengthened sense of efficacy was, in his view,
the best means of strengthening both the individual's sense of right and
the common standards of legitimacy. (Rousseau-if it need be said-
knew that there was a danger in this, the threat of spurious or total-
itarian identification, which is why he favored the small state and a
strong pluralism if a large one were necessary.) To weaken that sense
of importance would be to weaken both; Rousseau understood "repres-
sive desublimation" much earlier (not to say much better) than Mar-
27. Cf. Twain, A Defense of General Funston, in TnE DA aNED HuMAN RACE 82 (J.
Smith ed. 1962).
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cuse,28 commenting that a good state has few criminals and a bad one,
many pardons.
It is revealing that while both Locke and Rousseau accepted the risk
of violence as a check against possible usurpation, Locke justified the
risk by arguing that men would be too cautious in the face of power to
use violence lightly; Rousseau argued that such disturbances might
give "wings to the soul."29
Rousseau's view, in fact, paralleled that summarized in Figure 1;
the emergence of violence was itself a sign of the soul taking flight,
moving away from the fearful original man who was always potentially
violent, to a civil man who is never violent from choice and rarely
feels the need. It was the sign of a middle level in human development,
which challenged the state to go the next stage-to make a man feel
still more significant than violence allowed him to. His proposition
reversed Madison's: enable the governed to control the government,
and the government will take care of itself.
Through most of American history, we were able to achieve a sense
of significance through a faith in history itself. History became the
trustee of our dignity, the justifier of our frustrations. The long term
might do what the short could not, and outbreaks of violence were
restricted to the times when history seemed, unaccountably, to have
broken down or to have become unusually promising-the second being
the far less frequent case. As few need to be told, history in our age has
become suspect. Is it strange that the two most notable movements of
protest speak in a note of despair so strong that the classic charge of
the old-"unrealistic utopianism"-rings rather hollow?
Ours, to adapt Dickens, are not only the best and worst, but the most
mediocre of times. We are threatened more in spite of, and because of,
the fact that we have more; with more means to fight, in absolute
terms, we fear fighting more, and with more reason to submit partly-
more excess above our needs-we fear to do so. Less able to feel sig-
nificant in the society, we identify more strongly with what is dose and
under our control; our standards of what can legitimately be asked of
us decline with what we can ask of others.
In this sense, the violent potentiality of the society the Framers
designed, one which divided the mind of each man into warring halves
-his strong role within a weak sphere, his weaker role in a strong one-
have come home to roost. These are, in this sense, violent times be-
28. See H. MAIAcusE, ONE DLDIEsIONAL MAN (1964).
29. J. J. RouSSEAu, supra note 10, at 83 n.1.
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cause of their ambiguity. We oscillate between wild tendencies toward
permissiveness ("many pardons") when we can see ourselves as poten-
tially subject to claim and sanction (the liberal case for civil rights still
rests, largely, on the precedent they set for my case), and equally wild
violence when we gee ourselves threatened. All that varies is the ox.
These are also mediocre times: our goods come to us by a routine
process, and, as we know, most of the great goods of man have become
routine. The calm lagoon, Melville said, is a delight to those who have
braved the tempest, but to those who have not it is ennui. Violence is
excitement, for it involves risk, the exhilaration of winning and the
threat of losing, and the boredom-and the permissiveness at private
levels-of modem America does not make violence less appealing.
(Though the very boredom of the goods we possess, their heavy cer-
tainty, makes the remaining threats doubly dangerous because they
are, to most Americans, still goods). Many are excluded, most are bored
but fear to lose, others are bored simply. Some hope and others fear
violence and all delight in its fascination.
Most of our violence is private, in our small sphere-suicide, now
our fourth cause of death, crime, possessiveness, marital crisis. It can
be argued that these are but little more prevalent than in the past, but
that would only underline the fact of our new and otherwilse unex-
plained interest in them. It is interesting that a Presidential Commils-
slon found cause to lament that we were, in racial terms, "becoming
two societies"-as if we had ever been anything else.
It is not violence we regard as an enemy, but violence directed in
some sense "at us," either because it threatens us or because we might
commit it. Much less attention, and fewer turgidly agonized discus.
sions, were formerly directed at the internecine, private and semi-public
forms of violence among blacks and among students11 Even ghetto
riots aroused little interest except when it was suggested that they were
aimed at all whites, a suggestion which prevailed even though the vast
majority of those injured are still black. Millions of Americans were
shocked by Chicago because police violence threatened young people
who were in some sense "their own," and the language of the Walker
Report-"police riot"-suggests how deep is the need to separate dis.
approval in this "unusual" case from the day-to-day Violence suffered
by black America.
In fact, the community at large has been so fearful of, and so fearfully
30. Though these last, like hazing or panty-raids, certainly disrupted the "reasoned
atmosphere" of the university, they did not disturb ours.
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attracted to, the physical forms of violence that it has seemed to demand
them as the price of access to itself. The mass media, faithful in this at
least, have echoed the demand, making violence the price of attention,
but offering that forum and notoriety to any who would provide it,
whether from the left, the marginal classes, or the right, or whether-
like Sirhan-they are simply desperate men who have found the one
available means to significance which comes to their hand, more ra-
tional though more unfortunate than suicide.
Students and blacks, the most visible political protesters of the time,
depend for their effectiveness on the response of the dominant com-
munity, and it is clear that, having demanded physical violence as a
price of attention and feeling threatened enough from other sources,
that community is likely to follow the historic pattern of dispropor-
tionate and violent response to the threat of violence from rising
groups. Threats aside, violent anti-violence has intrinsic satisfactions.
Perhaps, as in the past, this may presage a kind of accommodation,
though at the expense of a tragic waste of time, and of the final and
irrevocable losses that are the real horror of physical violence. And in
any case, it is hardly wise to rely on the long term.
"Confrontation" would, in the best circumstances, be necessary be-
tween black and white, old and young. Confrontation is simply that,
an effort to pierce the veil and find the face, the real self of the other,3'
not merely of the opponent, but also of one's friends, whose devotion
is put to the test, and of oneself. In one sense a threat, it is, in another,
an effort to force all parties to be free, and if we respond intelligently,
it may be more of the latter than the former. Though confrontation
is always violent, it need not take physical forms. Picket lines and bitter
rhetoric, to take only two examples, are violence too. To respond intel-
ligently requires combat and concession at a point before either of the
protesting groups turns irrevocably to physical violence out of despair
of any alternative, and adequate concessions demand an adequate assess-
ment of our weakness.
Students and blacks are not, except in a very narrow sense-for
students do get older-the "wave of the future." As David Easton has
pointed out,32 they are among the last of the face-to-face societies, con-
centrated in localities where a high standard of legitimacy can arise
31. See Cleaver's references to the fact that white America has "brainwashed" itself,
and must, presumably, be liberated. E. CLEAvFr, supra note 8, at 134-35.
92. D. Easton, Children and Political Instability (paper presented at the annual meet-
ipg of the Western Political Science Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, April 3, 1969). The
proceedings of the meeting are reported in 22 W. POL. Q. 655 (1959).
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within the community itself (in this, students have a considerable ad-
vantage; the ghetto is hardly the ideal environment in which to build
community and solidarity). It would be no offense under most circum-
stances to tell a business executive, "if you don't like it, go elsewhere."
It might well be financially advantageous, and he probably has scant
attachment to his fellow workers. In both considerations, he is no
different from most professionals and academics. It is an offense to a
student because it asks him not only to give up academic advantages,
but because it asks him to leave his friends and because it mocks his
devotion to his college.S3 For equally serious reasons, it is an offense to
tell a black to desert his racial brothers in the interest of gain. All of
this indicates community; it also indicates weakness, marginality in a
world of great organizations that span continents and technology which
conquers space. Who, apart from Grayson Kirk, really cares if someone
seizes Grayson Kirk's office? Or whether there is a riot in a black ghetto?
The face-to-face community is bounded by its own space, impotent out-
side the limited resources it controls.
Left to itself, that analysis of the power to inflict injury on the rest
of us would be radically misleading. As in all cases involving legitimacy,
there is a question of right involved, and here established society must
understand its weakness. Professor Easton has attempted to explain
student protest by a simple demographic analysis, which would treat
protest as a function of the increasing percentage of the population
who are young.34 Such an argument presumes that the student standard
of what is rightfully theirs is a constant which bulks larger with nunl-
bers.35 But the argument does not explain why, unlike older forms of
student violence, the current examples have been political rather than
private or internecine. It is certainly important that students achieved
early successes in their protests, and that an increased sense of sig-
nificance, aided by media interest, has grown with time. Yet the process
cannot be understood except in its relation to a rise in the student's
sense of right. In part, this is a result of an increased sense of the
"wrongness" of established authority. In a more important sense, it is
a result of the struggles of blacks. Everyone concedes such an influence
(though most are too kind to suggest that a residual element of racism
was involved-"if it is legitimate for them, then surely it is for us"), but
83. The same offensiveness applies to our implicit toleration of emigration to avoid
the draft while punishing resistance, which mocks devotion to the country.
34. See D. Easton, supra note 32.
35. The same analysis could be applied to blacks, but Professor Easton is' too wise to
do so.
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the influence is as powerful as it is because it touches the desire for
significance instead of anonymity, for a political society in which claims
can be made by me, and will be made on me. Violence and affluence
could turn both movements back into the petty violence of private
life, but that result would be tragic, for both-however inchoately
and stutteringly-have the promise, in their increasing standard of
legitimacy, of a liberation for us all. 3:
After all, the crisis of legitimacy, as it has been called, does not in-
volve a challenge by blacks or by students to our "core values." At
most, it involves a challenge to our procedures, and often, even in this
case, they only demand access to them. Yet the crisis does demand
change, if only to decrease the likelihood of the worst forms of physical
violence. In the simplest sense, the crisis requires a rapid expansion
of the sense of right and significance among the disadvantaged, and, if
violence on the part of the marginal classes is to be avoided, the crisis
requires a similar expansion among them (though, obviously, at a
lesser rate). In fact, the requirement is one in which all our people
have a claim.
That may seem impossible, and perhaps it is. Any change, however,
demands that we abandon our fascination for a government of mechan-
ical contrivances and procedures designed to avoid conflict and to
reduce politics to "brokerage" if not to eliminate politics altogether.
It is necessary that we do so if only to become free of illusion; in an
age of change the old procedures which were thought to give the
political system a mechanical security apart from the virtue and par-
ticipation of its citizens have decayed or passed away. A procedure is a
path between end and circumstance, which is what gives it legitimacy,
but in a time when all change accelerates, such paths become outmoded
almost as soon as they are devised.37
All the crises of our time insist that we aim at a politics of involve-
ment,38 and, other requirements aside, such a politics must seem excit-
ing and important to men; it must, in other words, involve a kind of
violence. There is nothing foreign to politics in this; not long ago,
political scientists described politics as a "battle," a "struggle" or an
"arena." There is even less that is foreign to the law, which is a ritual-
ized combat, imperfectly concealing the less ritualized forms from
36. See H. NEBURG, supra note 9, at 133-63.
37. I have developed this argument in mud more detail in Civil Disobedience and
Contemporary Constitutionalism, 1 Comp. POL. 211 (1969).
38. Cf. Lipsitz, If, As Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, WI'hat Are W5e To
Do Then To Save Our Souls7, 62 Am. POL. $CL REV. 527 (1968).
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which it grew. The liberal tradition, and our own growing fears and
desires for "stability," helped blind us to the fact, but even so, political
scientists abandoned their "battle" rhetoric only to speak of the "rules
of the game." Games, at least, are a pleasant form of violence. But
games do not have rules: rules define what the game is, as well as who
can play. And the more important the game, the more intolerable to
be left out.
Since politics is the kind of game one must either play or watch, we
must not be surprised if we are asked whether it is worth playing and
whether another would not be better. If it is too much to ask, in the
mass states of our time, that everyone be a player, politics must at least
be interesting to the spectator. If it is not, they will boo or, as they have
been doing, engage in the kind of protest where the cheerful metaphor
of games falls short altogether. If the game of politics is to hold its own
against the spectacles of the Colosseum, it must prove that the gains to
be won are greater and more real and less attended by loss than they
presently appear, and that the game involves the kind of violence that
best enables a man to find himself, his friends, and a standard of
legitimacy.
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